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Guin: Ramifications of Miscegenation Statutes

RAMIFICATIONS OF MISCEGENATION STATUTES
Introduction
Vliscegenation statutes are a part of the law in most states. The
varying language of these statutes has created certain problems of
statutory construction and has raised serious problems of constitutionality. Based, as these statutes are, on the power of the state to
regulate marriages in general, some preliminary discussion of the basic
principles of marriage is required to enable the reader to understand
the underlying principles involved in such laws and the reasons for
their existence.
Marriagein General
Marriage has been defined as an institution,' a status,2 a contract s
a relationship brought about via a contract,4 and a contract sui generis
in nature. 5 Some cases have embraced two or more of the above
terms,6 so quite obviously there is no standard definition of the term
marriage. A classic example of this admixture of definitions can be
found in Sweigart v. State7 which expresses the concept of marriage
relation is more than a personal relationship between the spouses,
since it constitutes a status founded on contract and established by
law, an institution regulated and controlled by law founded on principles of public policy. Bishop regarded marriage as the civil status
of one man and one woman legally united for life, with the rights
and duties which, for the establishment of families and the multiplication and education of the species, are, or from time to time may
thereafter be, assigned by the law to matrimony. 8 Blackstone called
marriage a civil contract 9 but it is thought that in expressing this
view he was attempting to get away from the idea of a religious
contract. 1 0
In South Carolina our courts now regard marriage as a status"
which constitutes a change from previous cases which had defined
1. Sweigart v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 12 N. E. 2d 134 (1938).
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).

2.

3. Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N. Y. 313, 165 N. E. 460 (1929).

4. French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N. E. 714 (1935).

5. Franzen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 130 N. 3. L. 457,
33 A. 2d 599 (1943).
6. State ex rel Foster v. Anders, 135 Fla. 59, 184 So. 515 (1938).
7. Sweigart v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 12 N. E. 2d 134 (1938).
8. Bisnop oN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ch. 1, § 3 (5th ed. 1864).
9. GAVITs' BLACKSTONE 185 (1941).

10. Wiley v. Wiley, 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252 (1919).
11. Jackson v. United States, 89 F. 2d 572 (1936).
568
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it as a civil contract.' 2 Regardless of the definition chosen by the
various courts, however, one fact remains clear: marriage relations
13
in all jurisdictions are founded on contract principles, either civil
or of a sui generis nature. 14
While some seventeen states and the Territory of Alaska have
statutes which define marriage as a civil contract 1 5 and six states describe it as a "personal relation" growing out of a civil contract, 16
there are some marked distinctions between the contract of marriage
and the ordinary civil contract. These distinctions are: (1) the
marriage contract cannot be rescinded nor its fundamental terms
changed by agreement; 17 (2) it results in a status;18 (3) the tests
as to capacity differ from those of ordinary contracts ;19 (4) it is not
a contract within Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution which forbids legislation impairing the obligation of contracts ;20
(5) it is more than a contract between a man and a woman in that
the state is a party to every marriage. 2 ' In view of these distinctions
brought out in the cases it would seem logical to consider marriage
as a sui generis contract for which the states establish certain qualifications.
In every contract of marriage the state is thus clearly recognized
as an interested party. The relation between husband and wife is
no longer of purely private concern but is of concern to the commonwealth as well; hence the state is deeply concerned in its maintenance in purity and integrity 2 2 A state has, therefore, the power
to prescribe who may marry,23 at what age they may marry,2 4 the
duties and obligations created by marriage,2 5 and the effect of marriage on the property rights of the parties.2 6 The states possess this
power over marriages, notwithstanding constitutional inhibitions con12. Jewell's Lessee v. Jewell, 1 How. 219 (U. S. 1843).
13. VERNIR, AimRiCAN FAMILY LAws, ch. 1, § 14 (1931).
14. Lindquist v. Lindquist, 130 N. J. Eq. 11, 20 A. 2d 325 (1941).
1S. States defining marriage as a civil contract are: Arkansas,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin
oming.
16. States defining marriage as a personal relation growing out of
are: Calif6rnia, Idaho, Montana, Oklahoma, North Dakota, South
17. State ex rel. Foster v. Anders, 135 Fla. 59, 184 So. 515 (1938).

18.
19.
20.
21.

Colorado,
Nebraska,
and Wya contract
Dakota.

In re Morehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802 (1927).
Hess v. Pettigrew, 261 Mich. 618, 247 N. W. 90 (1933).
Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 5 N. E. 2d 815 (1936).
Lippincott v. Lippincott, 141 Neb. 186, 3 N. W. 2d 207 (1942).

22. Coy v. Humphreys, 142 Mo. App. 92, 125 S. W. 877 (1910).

23. Francois v. State, 9 Tex. App. 144 (1880).
24. State v. Ward, 204 S. C. 210,28 S. E. 2d 785 (1944).

25. Stevens v. United States, 146 F. 2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944).
26. Crouch v. Crouch, et al., 28 Cal. 2d 243, 169 P. 2d 897 (1946).
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cerning the impairing of obligations of contracts or interfering with
private rights and immunities,2 7 provided such regulations are not
prohibitory. 28 The power of the states being complete in this area,
permits them to establish degrees of consanguinity and affinity and to
forbid miscegenation. 2 9 These laws if sumptuary, however, have
no extra-territorial effect.8 0
The Federal Constitution confers no power on the Federal government to regulate marriage or its dissolution in the states31 since that
power was reserved to the state by the Constitution.8 2 This point
was well expressed in State v. Gibson3 3 in which the court ruled
that Congress has no power under the Federal Constitution to regulate or control the institution of marriage in the several states of the
union. This decision, although rendered in 1871, is still followed by
our courts, and in Stevens v. United States,3 4 the court ruled that a
state, within the range of permissible adoption of policies deemed to
be promotive of the welfare of society as well as of individual members thereof, is empowered to forbid marriages between persons of
African descent and persons of other races or descents without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. From these decisions it can be
seen that each state has the power to control marriages within its
borders.3 5 As was pointed out in State v. Walker 6 the state legislatures in exercising such power must prescribe reasonable regulations; otherwise it seems logical that an individual could seek protection of the Constitution under the theory that marriage is a natural
right.3 7 The only places in which the Federal government has the
power to regulate marriages are the District of Columbia and in the
territories of the United States. 8
As a general rule, the validity of a marriage depends on the law
where the marriage is performed. This idea is expressed in a number of cases and, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Story, 9 has been the
prevailing view since the first case involving such a question. Con27. Tipping v. Tipping, 65 App. D. C. 222, 82 F. 2d 828 (1936).

28. State v. Walker, 36 Kan. 297, 13 P. 279 (1887).
29. V'RNxeR, AMERICAN FAMTILY LAWS, ch. 3, § 37 (1931).
30. Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 177 N. W. 683 (1920).
31. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 141 Neb. 186, 3 N. W. 2d 207 (1942).
32, Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk) 287 (1871).
33. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. Rep. 131 (1871).
34. Stevens v. United States, 146 F. 2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944).
35. Howe v. Howe, 179 Va. 111 18 S E. 2d 294 (1942).

36. State v. Walker, 36 Iran. 297, 13 P. 279 (1887).
37. Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 54 P. 143 (1898).

38. Great Northern R. Co. v. Johnson, 166 CCA 181, N. P., 254 F. 683 (1918).
39. SORv, CONFLIcTS or LAws, § 113 a. (8th ed. 1841).
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versely, as a general rule, if the marriage is invalid at the lex loci
contractus, then it is invalid everywhere o
The courts of the states uphold these rules not because they are
bound to do so under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution but on grounds of sound policy and comity. 41 Based, however, as these are on comity rather than full faith and credit, the
states have engrafted some exceptions to the general rule of recognition. Exceptions to the general rule that a marriage valid where
contracted is valid everywhere are: (1) incestuous or unnatural
marriages;42 (2) polygamous marriages;43 (3) marriages by parties
under the age of consent entered into in a foreign state ;44 (4) where
the citizens of one state go to another state for the purpose of evading the laws of the domiciliary state ;45 (5) marriages which the legislature of a state has declared shall not be allowed any validity because
they are contrary to the public policy of that state, e. g., miscegena,
tion.4 6
Miscegenation
Miscegenation has been defined as the intermarrying, cohabiting,
or interbreeding of persons of different races, when prohibited by
law 4 7 Naturally, as was the case of the term "marriage," there are
several definitions of this word. In some jurisdictions the courts
have held that living together is an essential of the criminal offense
known as miscegenation. 48 This has been held true even though there
were frequent acts of intercourse 4 9 In other states the courts have
ruled that a marriage between a white person and a colored person
was necessary to constitute the crime.5 0 Still, in other jurisdictions,
cohabitation in concubinage will be considered miscegenation. 5 ' It
must be noted that some states not only declare such marriages void
but make it a crime as well; these different statutory purposes are
one reason for the variations in definitions. It is apparent from this
that there is no single definition of the term miscegenation but it
can be said that miscegenation in the United States, as commonly
40. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 68 App. D. C. 313, 96 F. 2d 715 (1938).
41. Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425, 4 S. E. 2d 364
(1939).
42. Smith v. Goldsmith, 223 Ala. 155, 134 So. 651 (1931).
43. Yackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 33A. 317 (1895).
44. McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. 2d 457, 58 P. 2d 163 (1939).
45. In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. St 625, 39 A. 16 (1898).
46. U. S. ex reL. Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F. 2d 927 (1925).
47. See note, 79 Am. St 382.
48. Jackson v. State, 23 Ala. App. 555, 129 So. 306 (1930).
49. Wilson v. State, 178 Ark. 1200, 13 S. W. 2d 24 (1929).
50. Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263, 30 Am. Rep. 131 (1877).
51. State v. Treadaway, 126 La. 300, 52 So. 500 (1910).
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understood, consists of the marriage of a white person with a person
of another race.
Statutory prohibitions against the marriage of a white person with
a Negro or mulatto are found in thirty states,5 2 none of which are
in the New England and upper Atlantic states. In addition to this
particular restriction fifteen of these states prohibit intermarriage
of a white person and a person of Mongolian or Oriental descent ;5S
five states bar marriage between a white person and an American
Indian;54 and eight states prohibit cohabitation between persons of
different races.55 It is seen from the foregoing that miscegenation
statutes are not restricted to a particular section of this country nor
are they directed toward any certain race.
The South Carolina miscegenation statute reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful (a) for any white man to intermarry with
any woman of either the Indian or Negro races or any mulatto,
mestizo or half breed; (b) for any white woman to intermarry
with any person other than a white man; or (c) for any mulatto,
half breed, Indian, Negro or mestizo to intermarry with a
white woman; and any such marriage or attempted marriage
shall be utterly null and void and of no effect. Any person
who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars or imprisonment
for not less than twelve months or both in the discretion of
the court.56
As can be seen, the context of this statute is rather definite which
eliminates some of the difficulties encountered by other jurisdictions
when they were confronted with the task of interpretation.
In some jurisdictions when the courts have had to deal with statutes of this nature the question as to just what constitutes a "Negro"
or "colored person" has arisen and the decisions have tended to
52. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Wyoming. It must be noted that California's anti-miscegenation statute was declared invalid by the case of Perez v. Lippold-Cal.-198

P. 2d 17 (1948) but an attempt to repeal the statute during the 1949 legislature was unsuccessful.

53. Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming.
54. Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia.
55. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, Tennessee,
Virginia.
56. S. C. CoDZ, § 20-7 (1952).
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follow local social conditions 3 7 An Alabama statute declares that
it will be miscegenation'for a white person to marry or live in adultery or fornication with any Negro or descendant of a Negro.58 This
is an extreme view and is not followed in other jurisdictions. For
the purpose of miscegenation statutes the term "Negro" is commonly defined as one having one-eighth or more negro bloody 9
What constitutes a "Negro" can best be determined by turning
to the statutes in the various jurisdictions. Probably some of the
statutes, if ever challenged, would be ruled unconstitutional by the
courts due to the unreasonableness in their definition of what constitutes a Negro for this purpose. Miscegenation statutes have been
declared constitutional by a number of courts throughout the United
States 6 under the theory that such statutes express the public policy
of the individual state. This view was taken in Leon v. Torndlta61
in which the court stated that the legislature of a state has the power
to enact laws defining who, when, and under what circumstances its
citizens and subjects may marry and the causes of divorce upon which
the married status may be dissolved whenever public good or justice to parties would thereby be preserved. Such statutes have also
been held not to be abrogated by the Civil Rights Act.6 2 While the

constitutionality of miscegenation statutes has been challenged, the
courts have upheld these restrictions on marriage in a vast majority
of cases, basing their reasoning on the state's right to control the
marriage relationship.
As has been pointed out earlier, statutes prohibiting marriage because of race differences exist in a large number of our states. These
statutes tend to follow definite geographic lines and such is to be
expected. The chief bases for such legislation is no doubt the problem raised by the existence of minority racial groups coupled with
some degree of prejudice. States west of the Mississippi and especially those of the Pacific coast, are almost the sole authors of legislation prohibiting the intermarriage of white persons with those of
the Mongolian races. 63 The Southern states are the authors of legislation aimed at preventing Negroes and whites from intermarrying.
This geographic distribution of statutes prohibiting racial intermar57. Weaver v. State, 22 Ala. App. 469, 116 So. 893 (1928) ; Bailey v. Fiske,
34 Maine 77 (1852).
58. ALA. CoDn, ch. 60, § 360.
59. S. C. CoxsT. Art. III, § 33.
60. Stevens v. United States, 146 F. 2d 120 (1945).

State v. Pass, 59

Ariz. 16, 121 P. 2d 882 (1942).
61. Leon v. Torrulla, CCA Puerto Rico, 99 F. 2d 851 (1939).
62. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am. Rep. 739 (1877) ; Georgia v. Tutty,
41 F. 753 (1890) ; State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871).
63. VERNmI,,AAMRICAN FAmILY LAWS, ch. 3, § 44 (1931).
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riage leads to the conclusion that such legislation is based on psychological and physiological factors which the courts recognize and adhere to. 64
Void and Voidable Marriages

The question now arises as to the status of those persons who disregard the established laws and enter into a prohibited marriage relation. Are such marriages void or voidable?65 There is a general
distinction at law between a void and a voidable marriage. 66 If a
marriage is void, then no legal rights are conferred; and when such
marriages have been determined to be void, it is as if no marriage
had ever existed.6 7 The grounds for such result are usually based
on the incapacity of the parties to contract due to their relationship,
their mental or physical capacity, or some other expressed prohibition. 68
Voidable marriages differ from those that are void in that a voidable marriage may be subject to ratification by the parties and may
become valid, and is treated as valid until decreed void.69 Usually
where it is possible to construe a marriage as voidable in lieu of void,
such is done.70 A voidable marriage is valid prior to being avoided
by court action 7 ' and it must be brought before a court prior to the
death of the parties; otherwise, the marriage is considered valid
ab initio.72 A void marriage may be attacked collaterally even after
the death of the parties. 73 Generally, it may be said that marriages
void as against public policy and good morals cannot be made valid
by limitations or prescription, nor will they be sustained as a civil
contract since such a contract is against public policy. 74
The question as to void or voidable marriages does not come up
where the statutes use such words as "null and void," "utterly null
and void," and "illegal and void;" however, there is some question
when words less explicit are used. In such cases, the words should
always receive their natural force and effect where, by the use of wellknown rules of construction, they reflect the legislature's intent.75
64. Ibid.

65. See, 26 HARv. L. Raxw 536 (1913)

for discussion of effect of void

and voidable marriages.
66. It re De Conza's Estate, 114 N. J. L. 156, 146 A. 156, 176 A. 192 (1934).
67. Woodward v. Blake, 38 N. D. 38, 164 N. W. 156 (1917).
68. Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920).
69. State v. Smith, 101 S. C. 293, 85 S. E. 958 (1914).
70. Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658 (1864).
71. In re Martinez's Estate, 181 N. Y. S. 907 (1920).
72. Bowers v. Bowers, 10 Rich. Eq. 551 (S. C. 1858).
73. Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S. W. 175 (1915).
74. Simmons v. Simmons, 57 App. D. C. 216, 19 F. 2d 690 (1927).
75. Wilbur v. Bingham, 8 Wash. 35,35 P. 407 (1894).
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In South Carolina, the wording of the statute leaves no doubt as to
the intention of the legislature.
The question now arises as to just what happens in the case where
two people enter into a marriage valid where contracted and subsequently move to a state where such marriage violates the statute
against miscegenation. This question has come up in relatively few
cases and these are not in agreement. 76 It is well established that
if the parties are domiciled in one state and go to another state to
get married, the validity of that marriage depends on the law of the
domicilary state and not on the place of the contract. 77 This is true
because the question is one of legal capacity and not one of proper
solemnization of the marriage. As pointed out above, each state is
sovereign in respect to the control and the regulation of marriage
within its jurisdiction; hence, it has the power not only to determine
who shall assume but who shall occupy the marriage relationship within its borders. 78 As to the comity between the states, it must be
noted that no state is bound to grant such; but that they do so because justice demands it. No state is bound by comity to give effect
to marriages which are repugnant to its own laws and policies. 79 The
legislature of a state may declare what marriages shall be void in
its own state notwithstanding their validity in the state where performed. They can do this as to marriages where the parties in good
faith domiciled in another state move to or return to a state having
such a statute 0 so long as that state has a positive law against such
marriages. The South Carolina statute pertaining to the subject
under discussion would constitute a positive law as to miscegenation. 1
As can be seen, the first matter for consideration when such a case
arises is the statute of that state in which the parties are located. If
the terms of the statute void such relationship in definite expression,
then the invalidity of the marriage follows without the court having
to turn to the lex domicile or leX loci.s2 If the statute merely prohibits such marriages in general terms, then it becomes necessary
to examine the nature and object of the statute in order to determine
the scope of prohibition.8 3 Thus the object of such a statute may
76. State v. Ross, 76 N. C. 242, 22 Am. Rep. 678 (1877) ; Horton v. Horton,

22 Ariz. 490, 198 P. 1105 (1921).
77. State v. Kennedy, 76 N. C. 251, 22 Am. Rep. 683 (1877).
78. Re Gregorson, 160 Cal. 21, 116 P. 60 (1911).

79. Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425, 4 S. E. 2d 364
(1939).
80. Moore v. Hegenan, 92 N. Y. 521, 44 Am. Rep. 408 (1883).
81. S. C. Cone § 20-7 (1952).
82. McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. 2d 457, 58 P. 2d 163 (1936).
83. State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 38 A. 81 (1897).
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be fully satisfied by limiting it to marriages entered into within the
borders of that particular state. Where it is possible to do this, the
legislatures and courts usually do so.84 When the courts are confronted with such a situation, they follow the general rule that the
intent of the legislature must find a clear expression in the statute8 5
and in the absence of such clearly expressed intent, the lex loci contractu.s controls.
While it must be admitted that in most cases it is difficult to determine whether a statute is a part of the public policy, it is a question which must be determined by the facts involved in each particular
case. This determination is left up to the courts of the state in which
the statute was enacted. It is axiomatic that miscegenation statutes
are an expression of public policy.

conclusion
One of the most widespread racial restrictions in the United States
is to be found in the field of marriage. Such regulations are founded
on the firm ground of logic and common sense. Such measures as
the current miscegenation statutes should be placed under the heading of "protective" rather than "discriminatory" laws if they are to
be accurately catalogued.
The first basis for enacting a law restricting intermarriage between
the races can be found in a study of Mendel's Law.86 This law had
its inception in an obscure journal in the year 1866. Mendel cited
the results of several years work on the breeding of ordinary garden
peas, in that particular article, and in so doing established a law over
which no man has control. From crosses between different varieties
of peas he derived the simple law of heredity which bears his name
today. In 1900 investigators working independently reaffirmed the
Mendelian principle and from that time forward Mendelian ratios
87
have become the foundation of all genetics.
Under this theory, it was ascertained that certain physical characteristics are inherited from one's forefathers and, while certain of these
may be recessive in the immediate generation, it is highly possible
that they will spring forth in a later generation.88 In other words,
physiological factors are in a large measure due to the individual's
inheritance from his parents as well as from the long line of ances84. Smith v. Goldsmith, 223 Ala. 155, 134 So. 651 (1931).
85. State v. Hand, 87 Neb. 189, 126 N. W. 1002 (1910).
86. GRIFVITHr, GxNERAr,

87. MASBY,
88. Ibid.

INTRODUCTION To PSYCHOLOGY, 260 (1928).
PSYCHOLOGY PRINCIPALS AND APPLIcATIoNs, 196 (1950).
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tors reaching into the past.89 From this it can be seen that it would
be highly possible for two white persons to produce a child with
Negroid characteristics provided there has been intermixture of the
races in the past.
The second reason for such laws actually hinges on the first. As
was pointed out in Plessy v. Ferguson,90 legislation is powerless to
eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based on physical
differences, and any attempt to do so can only result in accenting
the difficulties of the situation. A statute which implies a mere legal
distinction between the white and colored races has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two since such a distinction is
founded in the color of the races which will exist so long as men are
distinguished from each other by color.
While it is true that some courts have upheld miscegenetic marriages even though their own state laws forbid such,9 ' they are in a
small minority and were not confronted with a situation such as that
92
existing in Tucker v. Blease.
In a marriage between a white person and another with less than
one-eighth negro blood, the children born had negroid characteristics.
After a petition by citizens of the community, it was necessary for
the State to set up special school facilities apart from both white and
negro schools since the children were acceptable to neither group.
When difficulties such as this can exist, miscegenation statutes serve
the useful purpose of preventing social conflict and possible social
upheaval. While the preservation of the structure of a given society
is not the primary function of a state, it does owe a duty to its citizens that changes in the social structure evolve gradually and without excessive internal conflict.

JISSt J. GUIN, JR.

89. Ibid.
90. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138 (1896).
91. State v. Kennedy, 76 N. C. 251, 22 Am. Rep. 683 (1877).

92. Tucker v. Blease, 97 S. C. 303, 81 S. E. 668 (1914).
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